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Abstract: This article argues that the signifi cance of Anselm’s contribution to 
the concept of Eternity as a divine attribute is his well-articulated conception 
of it as “Maximum”, connecting it to the logic of simplicity. The beginning 
of this article reviews the ongoing debates over Anselm’s idea of timeless 
Eternity, including the work of Pike, Leftow, and Rogers. By contextualizing 
Anselm’s work in light of his textual sources, including Augustine, Boethius, 
and possibly Hilary of Poitier, it clarifi es the exact ways Anselm moved the 
conversation of his time forward. It then analyzes the role Eternity plays in the 
structure of the Monologion, suggesting that Anselm saw that the metaphor of 
“containment” was enfolded within notions of “presence.” In order to preserve 
God’s transcendence and immanence, Anselm argues for a kind of presence 
that does not imply containment based upon ideas of divine Maximum.
Key words: Anselm, Boethius, Augustine, De Trinitate, Hilary of Poitier, Eternity, 
timeless, time, transcendence, immanence, Monologion.
Resumo: Este artigo discute que a importância da contribuição de Anselmo 
ao conceito de Eternidade como um atributo divino é a sua concepção bem 
articulada como “Máximo”, ligando-a à lógica da simplicidade. O início deste 
artigo revisa os debates em curso sobre a ideia de Anselmo de eternidade 
atemporal, incluindo o trabalho de Pike, Leftow e Rogers. Ao contextualizar o 
trabalho de Anselmo a luz de suas fontes teóricas, inclusive Agostinho, Boécio, 
e, possivelmente, Hilary de Poitiers, fi ca clara a forma exata como Anselmo 
levou adiante a discussão de seu tempo. Em seguida, ele analisa o papel que a 
Eternidade desempenha na estrutura do Monologion, sugerindo que Anselmo 
percebeu que a metáfora da “contenção” foi envolvida dentro de noções de 
“presença”. A fi m de preservar a transcendência e imanência de Deus, Anselmo 
defende uma espécie de presença que não implica contenção com base em 
ideias de Máxima divina.
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Anselm of Canterbury is probably best known for his ontological argument 
for the existence of God, but in recent years, he has become increasingly associated 
with the idea of “timeless” Eternity. In this article, I will be taking up his conception of 
divine Eternity, which has implications for our understanding of divine transcendence 
and immanence. Anselm’s work combines Augustinian and Boethian doctrines of 
God to produce an original notion of divine Eternity centred upon the idea of God 
as “Maximum.”2 I will focus upon what I think is the core of Anselm’s significance as 
found in the Monologion (1936) because I believe the root of his most innovative ideas 
can be found here. Later works such as the Proslogion (1936), De veritate (1936), and 
De concordia (1936) develop these ideas and will be referred to as needed. 
Highlighting the details of the Augustinian and Boethian context of Anselm’s 
writings helps to clarify its significance and structure. I divide Anselm’s arguments for 
God’s Eternity into two kinds: arguments for transcendent Eternity and arguments 
for immanent Eternity. The former arguments have been all but ignored in most 
contemporary scholarship. Anselm’s arguments for transcendent Eternity have 
implications for the doctrine of divine immanence, which entails transcendent 
Eternity’s presence in time without its containment by time. In tracing Anselm’s 
arguments on this theme, I draw attention to his use of the metaphors of presence 
and containment to explain transcendent Eternity’s immanence in time. Anselm’s 
arguments expose underlying assumptions concerning the nature of presence that 
lead to misunderstandings of how an eternal God interacts with his temporal creation. 
Many misunderstandings of Anselm’s concept of divine Eternity in the 
Monologion have arisen because of a failure to distinguish his arguments for 
transcendent Eternity from his arguments for immanent Eternity. The tendency to 
focus upon categorizing concepts of divine Eternity along the lines of “everlasting” 
versus “atemporal” may be partly to blame for this misunderstanding. In the last 
forty years, there has been some disagreement over whether Boethius or Anselm 
should be viewed as the paradigmatic espouser of the notion of God’s “timeless” or 
“atemporal” Eternity. The division of theories of God’s Eternity into “everlasting” and 
“atemporal” views has encouraged scholars to ask the wrong questions about the 
nature of God’s Eternity. It is more helpful to categorize theories of divine Eternity 
according to the way they navigate the idea of divine transcendence and immanence 
rather than whether Eternity exists temporally or atemporally.3
In addition, a particular thinker’s theory about the structure of time is less 
important than whether that thinker believes that time is a created thing. If time 
is a created thing, a transcendent, creator God can never be “bound” by His own 
creation. This “binding” of the Creator by his creation is what is meant by the 
problem of time “containing” Eternity. Until scholars understand that, they will 
not understand Anselm’s concept of divine Eternity. Since it is more important to 
2 Maximum is a term occasionally used by Anselm when he is talking about God and quantity. Following the 
example of Nicholas of Cusa in De Docta Ignorantia. I connect it with Anselm’s idea of God as Summa Natura/
Essentia, that is, God as highest nature because He is beyond a scale of comparison.
3 My theological use of “transcendent” and “immanent” ought not to be confused with certain other traditions 
of usage that may assert a sharper dichotomy between the immanent and the transcendent – a dichotomy that 
may map onto a nature/supernature distinction where the divine presence to nature is not emphasized. I am 
also not using transcendent in the purely medieval sense of “the transcendentals,” i.e. good, truth, unity, etc. 
In the present context, transcendence and immanence are two ways of viewing the same God: Immanence 
presupposes transcendence, making it a mystery to be explored. I use Immanence rather than omnipresence 
in this case because it is a transcendent presence in place and time. Although the underlying metaphor of 
omnipresence is “presence,” it is typically defined as “being everywhere” whereas what is meant in this case 
is: being everywhere (place) and always (every time) without losing properties of transcendence such as unity, 
greatness, etc. It is particularly characteristic of Anselm’s thought that he took the parallels between the 
categories of place and time to their logical extensions. For an example of this sort of usage, see (Gersh, 1984).
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stress time as a created thing necessary for sensible objects, I will not attempt to 
fully uncover Anselm’s “theory of time’s structure” – if he had one – except insofar 
as it is necessary for my arguments concerning Eternity in Anselm. Neither will I try 
to categorize his theories within the framework of McTaggart’s A-series or B-series 
time or other permutations (McTaggart, 1908, 1909).4 As will shortly become clear, 
the combined work of Leftow and Rogers has shown, at minimum, that such a 
problem should not be addressed in merely one article, and this is not that article. 
Instead, I will outline certain basic notions of time, simultaneity, and containment 
that Anselm would have had available to him from his sources in order to show 
that these ideas remain key regardless of Anselm’s precise theory.
Literature review
In 1970, Nelson Pike published God and Timelessness, in which he attempted 
to understand and find a justification for the traditional doctrine of God as 
timeless. This book appears to lay some foundation, along with Pike’s argument 
for theological fatalism, for the increasingly influential Open Theism movement. He 
followed Schleiermacher in choosing the word “timeless” because he understood 
God’s Eternity to have two widespread meanings: (i) God is timeless and (ii) God 
“has unending duration” (Pike, 1970, p. ix). In this work, he upholds Anselm and 
Schleiermacher as the two strongest defendants of God’s timelessness.5 Asserting 
that neither Anselm nor Schleiermacher adequately defends the doctrine of the 
Christian God’s Eternity, he ends the book with a question which has had broad 
influence: “what reason is there for thinking that the doctrine of God’s timelessness 
should have a place in a system of Christian theology?” (Pike, 1970, p. 190). After 
Pike’s book, an increasing number of philosophers and theologians have begun to 
doubt whether it is truly necessary for a perfect God to be timeless.
In 1981, Eleanore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (whom Pike acknowledges 
for his contributions to God and Timelessness) co-authored an influential article 
entitled “Eternity.”6 This article attempts to make the Boethian concept of eternity 
coherent within an analytic philosophical context. Stump and Kretzmann argue 
that Boethius’ model (with some modern interpolations), rather than Anselm’s, 
is the higher ground from which to defend the doctrine of Eternity.7 The key to 
the Boethian definition is how a person understands simultaneity. Simultaneity is 
dependent upon an eternal or temporal perspective. Time has many “nows,” but 
there is only one “now” in Eternity. Eternity’s simultaneity is “simultaneous existence 
or occurrence at one and the same eternal present” (Stump and Kretzmann, 1981, p. 
435). According to relativity theory, the simultaneity of temporal events is dependent 
4 Oddly, most of the literature continues to ignore McTaggart’s main question of whether Time was even real.
5 He does deal briefly with Plato, Augustine, Boethius, and Thomas Aquinas, but the emphasis is upon Anselm 
and Schleiermacher.
6 It should be noted from the beginning that Stump and Kretzmann, unlike Pike, initially uphold the term 
“Eternity.” While Pike sees two definitions of Eternity (Timelessness and “limitless duration in time”), they 
believe the latter definition is more accurately called “Sempiternity”: for them, Eternity is Timelessness. Even 
so, Stump and Kretzmann’s article abandons the term “Eternity” in practice, if not in theory. Throughout the 
majority of the essay, they employ Whitehead’s term, “eternality” instead, which is defined as “the condition 
of having eternity as one’s mode of existence” (Stump and Kretzmann, 1981, p. 430). Although the term 
may have been subconsciously chosen, there are several potential problems with their use of terms, including 
the problem of whether “eternality” potentially implies a stricter dichotomy of divine substance and divine 
attributes than has been traditionally upheld.
7 They also introduce the idea of God’s atemporal Eternity as having a kind of duration (Stump and Kretzmann, 
1981, p. 225). Rogers has dealt extensively with this idea in Stump, Kretzmann and Leftow, upholding Anselm’s 
idea of Eternity as present in opposition to it. See “Eternity has no Duration” (Rogers, 1997, p. 151-174).
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upon the perspective of the observer. The interaction of the eternal “now” and 
temporal “nows” presents us with unique problems of simultaneity. Having identified 
the nature of these problems, Stump and Kretzmann invent a new term for when 
Eternity and Time intersect: ET-simultaneity. ET-simultaneity accounts for (or at least 
describes) the way events can happen simultaneously in Eternity but not in Time: 
Just because God sees my birth and my death in his eternal “now,” that does not 
imply that my birth and death do not really happen successively in time.
In 1984, David Burrell published a Thomistic response to their work, in which 
he argues that Anselm was one of the first to explicitly link Eternity with Aseity – the 
idea that God has no source or origin other than himself (Burrell, 1984). This article 
has not received the attention it deserves and in many cases contains the kernel 
of some of my present arguments. Burrell observes that the Stump-Kretzmann 
“Boethian” model of ET-simultaneity, while laudable in many respects, is really 
an Anselmian model in that it relies on metaphors of containment and presence. 
Burrell does not see his reduction of the Stump-Kretzmann model to metaphor as a 
criticism.8 Rather, it is merely a necessary consequence of the transcendent subject 
matter. Stump and Kretzmann have identified the semantic difficulties of using the 
term “simultaneous,” but that does not mean that they will be able to adequately 
explain the process. The very nature of transcendence prevents further precision. 
In 1991, Brian Leftow upheld an Anselmian model of Eternity as more 
plausible than the Boethian model espoused by Stump-Kretzmann. He wrote his 
book attempting to defend the traditional idea of Eternity against the numerous 
contemporary challenges.9 Contrasting it with Augustinian and Boethian views 
of time, Leftow uses Anselm’s account to construct what he considers to be a 
more coherent argument within current metaphysical discussion. Leftow argues 
for three changes in Anselm’s thought from his writing of the Monologion to 
that of the Proslogion. First, Anselm abandons his efforts in the Monologion to 
preserve omnipresence and chooses in the Proslogion to “claim that God is in all 
ways beyond time” (Leftow, 1991, p. 210). Second, he later argues that “to say 
that God is temporally omnipresent makes it sound as if creation is a receptacle 
that contains and so transcends its creator” (Leftow, 1991, p. 210). Third, in the 
Proslogion, Anselm introduces a new argument that “eternity literally contains time” 
(Leftow, 1991, p. 211). He calls this “reverse-containment theory.” Leftow believes 
that Anselm most fully develops this notion of eternity’s containment of time in 
De concordia. He follows Delmas Lewis’ interpretation of the following Anselmian 
quotation: “in eternity there is only a present, which is not a temporal present like 
ours, but an eternal present in which all of time is contained. As the present time 
contains every place and the things which are in any place, so the eternal present 
contains at once the whole of time and whatever exists at any time” (Leftow, 1991, 
p. 212). Leftow concludes that “Anselm’s claim that eternity contains time, then, 
amounts to the claim that time is embedded in a further dimension, location in 
which has at least some timelike qualities [sic]” (Leftow, 1991, p. 213). Once Anselm 
writes De concordia, according to Leftow, he believes that Eternity is “like a super-
temporal dimension” that God and creatures occupy whereas in the Monologion, 
Anselm had attempted to argue that God shared the same temporal co-ordinates 
as creatures (Leftow, 1991, p. 181, 214). Anselm posited this argument in order to 
8 Others have seen ET-simultaneity as an empty metaphor because it does not defi ne the key term “observe” 
without tautology.
9 “[Contrary to the] nearly unchallenged orthodoxy for the millennium between Athanasius and Duns Scotus...
the claim that God is timeless is widely considered to be at best needless and outmoded [Platonic] metaphysical 
baggage, and at worse incompatible with such central theistic claims as that God is omniscient, that God is 
an agent or a person, and that God can act in the world” (Leftow, 1991, p. 2-3).
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rectify Aristotelian problems of conditionality, which would make omnipresence, 
an essential attribute of God, dependent on the existence of a creation. Although 
Leftow believes this original problem is no longer an issue, he does believe the co-
existence of God and creation within a super-temporal realm allows God to be with 
rather than in/at all times in a better way than the ET-simultaneity model espoused by 
Stump and Kretzmann.10 Unfortunately, such a model appears to make God in some 
way dependent upon something outside of himself: an eternal dimension or matrix.
Brian Leftow’s primary interlocutor has been Katherin Rogers, a strong 
advocate for Anselmian “perfect being theology” (Rogers, 2000). While both scholars 
agree on the importance of Anselm and the pitfalls of Open Theology, they have 
disagreed over what they consider to be Anselm’s model of time. In contrast with 
Leftow’s theory of “Anselmian presentism,” Katherin Rogers portrays Anselm “as 
a pioneer of four-dimensionalism,”11 a position she has maintained in numerous 
publications (Rogers, 2009, p. 338, 1994, 2006, 2007).12 While her argument with 
Leftow deserves to be addressed more thoroughly, my current argument does not 
rely on either theory of time, and thus, I must pass over it more briefly.13
From this review of recent secondary literature, it should be apparent that 
the question is not if Anselm had a significant impact upon ideas of God’s Eternity 
but rather how to evaluate Anselm’s overall significance. 
10 Leftow thinks that from Anselm’s perspective, time and temporal things exist in God’s eternity “not just God 
and His creative act” (p. 360). Somehow this does not preclude events occuring in time: “events all occur in the 
frozen simultaneity of eternity. But that is just one way they occur. They also follow one another in time” (p. 360). 
It is not clear how (or if) Leftow avoids the idea of eternity as a dimension that contains God (and possibly other 
things such as time). While his model is diffi cult to imagine, this diffi culty should not necessarily be a criticism, 
given the paradoxical nature of the subject matter. In a later article, Leftow expounds upon his theory describing 
what he calls “Anselmian presentism” (Leftow, 2009). Normally “presentism” entails a form of A-theory (tensed) 
time in which only present objects exist, but Anselm believed in an eternal and temporal present. This entails not 
just two “presents” but two tenses. Within the temporal present, things are not “equally real at all locations” 
of past, present and future: “there are only two locations at which things are real, the temporal and eternal 
present. Time t exists in eternity, but this does not entail that t and what it contains are real at t. Rather, t and 
what it contains are located in eternity and real in eternity.” (p. 300). Thus, one must consider the coextension of 
two presents (temporal and eternal) and two existences (temporal and eternal). Which verb tense can be used is 
affected by these four variables: “presentness(t) and existence(t) are(t) coextensive. It is(t) not true that Anselm’s 
God exists(t), but that He exists(e)” (p. 300). As complicated as this model is, Leftow is seeking to uphold both 
God’s present and a time that really is fl eeting (not just one that appears to be). In a way, he is developing further 
the Stump-Kretzmann line of reasoning, which seeks to elaborate the implications for two very different “nows.”
11 A similar observation has been made by Craig (1986, p. 103).
12 Rogers’ terminology is the same that Evans (1977) uses in a more historically oriented article on the sources 
for Anselm’s views of eternity.
13 What she means by four-dimensionalism is a view of time in which fleetingness is a matter of perspective. 
This view contrasts with Leftow’s, who wants to uphold the reality of the fleetingness of the present from 
either a temporal or eternal perspective. She eschews the traditional labels for such a view, such as “tenseless 
time” (B- theory) and “eternalism” (both of which have been applied to Rogers’ work by Leftow) because they 
have certain unhelpful connotations. Rogers wants to avoid “tenseless time” because it connotes a “block” 
universe, which sounds static and finite (p. 323). Rogers rejects the term “eternalism,” because it can lead 
to an understanding of Eternity that is not God’s mode of being and seems to create confusing ideas about 
what it might mean to say an “eternal world” (p. 323). She believes this terminology could cause confusion, 
not because a B-theory implies an eternal world, but because the analytic philosophy habit of referring to the 
B-theory of time as “eternalism” might be misunderstood by a general audience to mean an eternal world. 
Rogers criticizes Leftow’s use of the term “presentism” as confusing because Open Theists, such as William 
Hasker, think that presentism entails “that absolutely all that exists in the present moment, such that God, too, 
must exist only in the present moment. That means that it is true at the present moment that God acts directly 
only at the present moment” (p. 336). Open Theism is a position that neither scholar holds, and Rogers’ article 
primarily addresses this position (p. 337-338). Her major concerns with Leftow’s position (a more fleeting 
present) are based upon his conceptions of God’s sight/knowledge. Finally, Rogers questions whether Leftow’s 
assertion that Anselm has two presents works if one follows Anselm’s consistent analogy between time and 
place: if there are two presents can there be two “heres” (p. 327)?
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Transcendent Eternity: The Meaning and 
Implications of Eternity as Summa Natura 
(Monologion 1-17)
In seeking Anselm’s conception of Eternity, most authors understandably 
proceed directly to Monologion 18-25, where Anselm addresses the ideas of 
beginnings, endings, places and times.14 But in the preface to the Proslogion, 
Anselm says that the Monologion is like a chain of many interwoven arguments 
(multorum concatenatione contextum argumentorum), meaning each argument 
builds upon the next. It is important to step back and see Monologion 18-25 within 
context. I would argue that Anselm considers Eternity from two perspectives: 
transcendence and immanence. The discussion that follows chapter 18 focuses on 
immanent Eternity, which assumes a notion of transcendent Eternity established 
in previous chapters. The roots of what it means to say that God is transcendently 
eternal and Eternity are enfolded within the beginning of the Monologion where 
God is described as being “one nature, which is the highest of all, alone sufficient 
in its eternal blessedness […] giving and making through its omnipotent goodness” 
(unam naturam, summam omnium quae sunt, solam sibi in aeterna sua beatitudine 
sufficientem [...] per omnipotentem bonitatem suam dantem et facientem [...]) 
(1.5-8.13). The key to unfolding this enfolding is a proper understanding of what 
Anselm means by God as summa natura or Maximum. Such unfolding will help us 
to better understand Anselm’s concept of transcendent Eternity.
What does it mean for Anselm to say that God is Maximum or that which 
it is always better to be without qualification? First, God is greater than all things 
both comparatively and absolutely. Much of Monologion 2-14 establishes God’s 
greatness with respect to his creation on the basis of his self-existent, creative, 
and sustaining nature. Such relative or relational terms merely express that God is 
greater than creation, but they do not say what God is. In Monologion 15, Anselm 
seeks non-relational terms (praeter relativa) to apply to God and asserts that by 
necessity all those terms that it is better to be than not to be must apply to the 
Maximum because it is “that than which nothing at all is better” (ipsum omnino 
melius sit quam non ipsum).15 Second, God’s greatness is not through participation. 
This conclusion follows from the arguments of cap. 2-14. Things that are relatively 
good are relatively good through something else, that is, through participation (cap. 
1, 5, and 7).16 But God is good, eternal, and whatever else he is, through Himself 
(cap. 5). Third, God is a simple whole, and this unity has implications for how we 
14 See for example: Leftow (1991, p. 183-216); Rogers (2006); Evans (1977). To begin here, however, would 
be a mistake because this section already assumes Eternity. This assumption is particularly clear when one 
examines just how Anselm answers the questions he poses at the beginning of Monologion 18: Ex quo igitur 
haec tam simplex natura creatrix et vigor omnium fuit vel usquequo futura est? An potius nec ex quo nec 
usque quo est, sed sine principio et sine fi ne est? (18.7-9.32). After laying out several arguments, Anselm then 
gives a further argument: si summa illa natura principium vel fi nem habet, non est vera aeternitas, quod esse 
supra inexpugnabiliter inventum est (18.9-10.33). When was this imexpugnabiliter argument that God is true 
Eternity given? To understand this argument, you must go back to how Anselm connects Eternity with the 
Highest Nature. better to be than not to be.” Quare necesse est eam esse viventum, sapientem, potentem et 
omnipotentem, veram, iustam, beatam, aeternam, et quidquid similiter absolute melius est quam non ipsum 
(15.29-33.28).
15 This test only applies to terms for which it is always truly better to be than not to be. It is not always better to 
be gold, for example, than not to be gold whereas it is always better to not be corporeal than to be corporeal. 
Anselmincludes eternal in the list of things it is better to be than to be without qualification. “Therefore, it is 
necessary that it is living, wise, powerful and omnipotent, true, just, blessed, eternal, and whatever similarly 
it is in every respect.
16 For more about participation, see fn. 31.
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reason about Eternity because there is a certain interchangeability of attributes (cap. 
17).17 From the idea of the Supreme Being’s simple, non-composite nature, Anselm 
develops a unique logic of simplicity, which has implications for how the attributes 
help to explain one another.18 
How does this concept of God as Maximum, and the Logic of Simplicity that 
arises from it, affect Anselm’s concept of Eternity? First, God’s Eternity is both 
relatively and absolutely great. Thus, his Eternity must be greater by definition 
than the things he has created, whether they are eternal angels, immortal men, 
or temporal things. While it may help initially to conceive of God’s Eternity as 
compared to other things, ultimately it is so much greater that there is no scale of 
comparison because God’s Eternity is a se. God is greater than his creation because 
he is self-existent and self-sustaining, which, as will be seen, are attributes closely 
connected to God’s Eternity. Eternity must transcend Time itself because Eternity is 
uncreated and Time is created. Second, to say that God is eternal is to say that He 
is Eternity. There can be nothing outside of God called “Eternity” that God inhabits: 
such an idea violates God’s unique priority before all things because it make him 
dependent upon something else. Leftow’s reverse containment theory appears to 
ignore this fundamental principle. Third, an eternal God is substantively eternal, 
i.e. Eternity itself. It is thus appropriate to capitalize “Eternity” as a name of God. 
He is eternal and Eternity. Since Maximum (summa), when applied to God, does 
not imply a quality or quantity, it must meant that Eternity is God’s unique state 
of being. Eternity within this view cannot be a matrix or any other thing (including 
necessary beings) extraneous to God’s substance. If God’s nature is simple in this 
way, one can conclude certain things about the nature of God’s Eternity from his 
other attributes (the “logic of simplicity”).
The Two Step Augustinian (De Trinitate) 
Argument for Transcendent Eternity 
(Monologion 18)
Anselm’s first argument for transcendent Eternity uses the logic of simplicity, 
borrowing from Augustine’s composition of Eternity from immortal Life (vita 
immortalis), unchangeableness (immutabilitas), and incorruptibility (incorruptabilitas). 
In De Trinitate (1968), Augustine equates God’s life (vita) with his being (essentia) 
and nature (natura) (15.5.7.15-16).19 Augustine notes that it is tempting to consider 
the name spirit (spiritus) as God’s substance while names such as eternal (aeternus), 
immortal (immortalis), incorruptibility (incorruptibilis), unchangeable (immutabilis), 
living (vivus), wise (sapiens), powerful (potens), beautiful (speciosus), just (iustus), 
good (bonus), and happy (beatus) as qualities of this substance (15.5.8.45-48). While 
17 Anselm describes this unity geometrically, comparing it to a simple point in De incarnatione 15. He also 
speaks of Eternity existing as a whole, rather than in parts, in Proslogion 18. For more discussion of Anselm’s 
use of geometry to describe time and Eternity, see (Evans, 1977).
18 This conclusion is perhaps one of the least intuitive for modern readers. The example is given of a man 
who is both bodily and rational. Neither term describes the man in his entirety; by contrast, Justice describes 
the Supreme Substance in its entirety because that Supreme Substance is just through itself (not through 
participation) and is not a composite substance (cap. 16). Anselm derives this logic of simplicity from the De 
Trinitate’s of Augustine and Boethius, both of which discuss the logical implications for the unity of God’s 
substance and his attributes. Predication of any sort must be applied in a modified fashion when speaking 
about God. Anselm will follow the lead of his models in making certain attributes substantive and interrelated. 
In particular, he follows Augustine’s exemplum that shows which attributes can be combined to make God’s 
Eternity. This example becomes a fundamental argument for Anselm.
19 This life and being is identical with his sensing and understanding.
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the tendency is to think of God’s spirit as his substance, all names of God refer to 
his substance, not just God’s spirit. Thus, it is possible to reduce such a long list of 
names so that it is easier to remember. Augustine’s first example concerns the name 
“eternal,” which he says can signify immortal, incorruptible, and unchangeable. Is 
this a metaphysical reality or merely the way humans approach the reality which is 
Eternity? Augustine does not answer this question. He is only clear that such talk 
about God’s attributes is in reality talk about God’s substance. 
This reduction of three names into one name – a Trinitarian move that serves 
a function in his larger argument – is the foundation for arguments concerning 
the nature of Eternity in Anselm. Not only do these arguments show the unitive 
and substantive nature of God’s attributes based upon the logic of simplicity, 
they also resemble the Trinity in their three-fold nature. Anselm turns Augustine’s 
argument into a two-step argument for God’s Eternity, based first upon God having 
no beginning and second upon God having no ending. While Anselm’s argument 
resembles Augustine’s, it has many characteristics that are uniquely Anselm’s own.
Anselm sees “being without beginning or end” to be an epistemologically 
easier concept, and therefore, uses it to build to the more difficult concept of Eternity. 
First, he shows that the Highest Nature must be without beginning and per se. He 
lays out three possibilities: it could begin (principium habet) from or through itself 
(ex se vel per se), from or through another thing (ex alio vel per aliud), or from or 
through nothing (ex nihilo vel per nihil) (18.9-12.32). The latter two possibilities 
are excluded precisely because it has already been shown that the Highest Nature 
must be per se in order to be the Highest. The first possibility is nonsensical for the 
following reason because there is a distinction between existing-per se-and-ex se 
and beginning-per se-and-ex se. The state of having the latter appears to imply two 
things: an initial being (the beginning) and a derivative one. In this way, Anselm 
argues that the Maximum merely exists per se and ex se without beginning.20 If 
this nature were to have a beginning from itself, this nature would be two natures 
rather than one. Since none of the three options are possible, the highest being 
must not have a beginning. Anselm’s proof shows that this Highest Nature is not 
only without beginning, but also without beginning in such a way that he is per se. 
Anselm has made Aseity the first step of the argument for Eternity.21
The second step of Anselm’s argument asks whether God is without end. For 
this argument, Anselm begins with the previously established attributes of supremely 
immortal (summe immortalis) and supremely incorruptible (summe incorruptibilis). 
If it is manifestly best that a nature neither die nor decay in any way, clearly God can 
have no end (and presumably no change that would imply such a thing). Anselm 
quickly moves from these basic arguments to ones not found in Augustine’s De 
Trinitate. He bases his argument on an even more fundamental concept – the highest 
good (summum bonum) (18.21.32-3.33). The Highest Nature could not end without 
willing to end and such a will could never be the highest good. Therefore, this nature 
must not have an end or it would be neither good nor immortal nor incorruptible.
20 “It could not have a beginning through itself although it exists from itself and through itself since it exists 
from and through itself such that there is in no way one being, which is from and through itself, and another 
being, which is that through which and from which the other being exists.’ Whatever moreover begins to 
exist from another or through another is wholly other than that being from which or through which it begins 
to exist. The Highest Nature, therefore, did not begin through itself or from itself (18.13-18.32). Vel per se 
initium habere non potest, quam quam ex seipsa et per seipsam sit. Sic enim est ex se et per se, ut nullo 
modo sit alia essentia quae est per se et ex se, et alia per quam et ex qua est. Quidquid autem ex aliquo vel 
per aliquid incipit esse, non est omnino idem illi, ex quo vel per quod incipit esse. Summa igitur natura non 
incepit per se vel ex se.
21 There are many fine articles that discuss the Aseity of God in Anselm with more depth than it is possible to 
do so here (Brower, 2007; Morreall, 1984; Burrell, 1984).
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Combining these two arguments, we get a notion of Eternity that is based 
upon lacking beginning or end but is clearly more than lacking beginning or end. 
The Highest Eternity exists through itself and does not decay or die because God’s 
goodness of will combined with his omnipotence entails that he will never have the 
desire to end and will always have the power to exist.
One step argument for transcendent Eternity 
based on the nature of Truth (Monologion 18 
and De Veritate)
At this point, Anselm completes his argument for a nature without beginning 
or end with an appeal to true Eternity (vera aeternitas) (18.10.33). Throughout 
his argument, he has used the conception of the Summa Natura as per se and 
summum bonum in order to expand to less obvious conceptions of that nature such 
as incorruptibility or immortality. He has taken the argument apart into two halves, 
examining whether it has a beginning and whether it has an ending separately. 
Now, he takes the idea in its entirety: lacking a beginning and an ending are both 
necessary aspects of true Eternity. 
It is at this point that Anselm introduces a new one step, syllogistic argument for 
Eternity based upon Augustine’s Soliloquia (1910), an inner dialogue between Augustine 
and Reason.22 In the Soliloquia, Augustine shows that God is Eternal because Truth does 
not begin and cannot end. If God is Truth and Truth has no beginning or end, then God 
must have no beginning or end. A corollary to this conclusion, based upon the logic 
of simplicity, is that God, as true Eternity, has no beginning or end.23 The argument 
for Eternity from Truth is particularly apt (although Anselm does not say it this way) 
because in the case of Truth a lack of beginning or ending in no way implies extension. 
While Anselmian scholarship has sometimes noticed this textual connection, 
it is not typically examined in scholarship on the nature of Eternity.24 Other 
scholarship has ignored this connection with Augustine completely, particularly 
22 The infl uence of this text upon the genre of the Proslogion is explored in Matthews (2007). The Soliloquia 
is critically platonic in that it explicitly refers to the statements of Plato and Plotinus about God that are true 
while still questioning whether they “knew” God (1.1.9).
23 There are two other possible Augustinian sources for the connection between Eternity and Truth that would 
have been available to Anselm: De libero arbitrio (CCL 29) and De magistro (CCL 29). The closest parallels 
appear to be from the Soliloquia. Unfortunately it is not clear whether either De magistro or Soliloquia were in 
Anselm’s library at Bec. See: (Gasper, 2004, p.207) In De libero arbitrio, we read: “In no way will you deny that 
there is unchangeable Truth, containing all those things which are unchangeably true.”nullo modo negaveris 
esse incommutabilem veritatem, haec omnia quae incommutabiliter vera sunt continentem (De libero arbitrio 
2.12.33.130.1-4); “Truth...remaining in itself neither increases when it seems more to us, neither does it 
decrease when less [is seen by us], but [is] whole and uncorrupted.”veritas...in se manens nec proficiat cum 
plus a nobis videtur nec deficiat cum minus sed integra et incorrupta... (De libero arbitrio 2.12.34.135.39-
44); later, Augustine compares Truth to hearing or seeing things as a whole with speaking them extended in 
time and says that “The Beauty of Truth and Wisdom...[is] that it is not completed in time nor does it depart 
from a location...[it is] sempiternal.”At illa veritatis et sapientiae pulchritude...nec peragitur tempore nec 
migrat locis...sempiterna (De libero arbitrio 2.14.38.151.42-46). Based upon Anselm’s work by the same title 
(De libero arbitrio) it appears that he has read this work, which talks about God’s Truth. See (Rieger, 2007, 
p. 574-580) From De magistro, there is: “We reflect upon Truth, which directs the interior of our mind...he 
who is reflected upon teaches [us], [this Truth is] Christ who is said to dwell in the inner man. He is the power 
and sempiternal Wisdom of the unchangeable God,”Intus ipsi menti praesidentem consulimus veritatem...
ille autem, qui consulitur, docet, qui in interiore homine habitare dictus est Christus, id est incommutabilis dei 
virtus atque sempiterna sapientia... 11.38.45-49. On the relationship between this work and the Proslogion 
see (Pouchet, 1964, p.84).
24 See for example, Hopkins, 2003, p.138-151, 148; Hopkins, 1972, 17. The connection between Eternity and 
Truth is not considered in most of the literature discussing Eternity in Anselm.
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within the context of Anselm’s De Veritate.25 If the nature of Eternity relies 
upon the nature of Truth, it is important to clarify exactly what sort of Truth is 
under discussion. The Soliloquia considers eternal Truth from two perspectives: 
(i) God as eternal Truth, and (ii) The eternity of true propositions in the mind 
of God.26 The first perspective is the one most important for understanding 
Anselm’s Monologion and the Eternity as a divine perfection. God is both Truth 
and Eternity because the fact that God is Truth, and Truth is eternal, implies 
that God is eternal Truth. Augustine’s identification of Truth with God, and not 
just true propositions, is clear from his opening invocation to “God, the Truth, 
in whom, by whom, and through whom all truths are true” (Deus veritas, in 
quo et a quo et per quem vera sunt quae vera sunt omnia) (1.1.3), who is “one 
eternal and true substance” (una aeterna vera substantia) (1.1.4). The Eternity 
of Truth is established in the following way: “Truth could not perish, because if 
not only the world perished but also Truth itself perished, it would still be true 
that the World and Truth perished. But nothing is true without Truth. In no way, 
therefore, does Truth perish” (2.15.28; cf. 1.15.29 and 2.2.2).27 Not only does 
this proof show that Truth cannot perish, it also shows that God cannot perish: 
If Truth cannot perish, and God is Truth, God cannot perish. At a minimum then, 
God’s Eternity must be equivalent to Truth’s Eternity.
Anselm will realize later that in order for this argument to be completely 
effective, he must elaborate his definition of Truth. He accomplishes this task in a new 
work, De veritate. This work is not frequently considered in scholarship on Anselm 
and Eternity, but it is foundational to his argument. Consider the following passage:
Student. Since we believe that God is truth, and we say that truth is in many other 
things, I would like to know whether we ought to confess that God is wherever truth 
is said to be. For you also, in the Monologion, prove through the truth of a statement 
that the highest truth has no beginning or end […] Therefore I desire to learn from 
you the defi nition of truth (De ver. 1.4-19.176).28 
And also:
Thus you can now understand how I proved through the truth of a statement, in my 
Monologion, that the Supreme Truth does not have beginning or end. For when I said, 
‘when was it not true that something was going to exist?’ I did not say that either 
that statement, which asserted that something would be in the future, was without 
a beginning, or that that particular truth should be God. Rather, I meant that it could 
not be understood when truth should be absent from it if that statement exists. As 
a result of this fact, since it could not be understood when that truth could not be 
(if the statement in which it could be exists), this truth is understood to be without 
25 See for example, Visser and Williams (2004, p. 204-221). An allusion is made to a tangential connection to 
Aristotle but even the authors admit that Anselm’s theory would have been foreign to Aristotle because of its 
divine emphasis. Such a divine emphasis is not foreign to the work of Augustine on Truth.
26 In context, these ideas undergird Augustine’s arguments for the immortality of the soul. As in De Trinitate, 
eternal life is here connected with eternal being and eternal understanding, but this time, in the context of 
the immortal human soul. Eternal life implies eternal existence, but more inquiry must be made into eternal 
knowing (2.2.2).
27 Veritatem non posse interire... quod non solum si totus mundus intereat, sed etiam si ipsa veritas, verum erit 
et mundum et veritatem interisse. Nihil autem verum sine veritate: nullo modo igitur interit veritas.
28 DISCIPULUS. Quoniam deum veritatem esse credimus, et veritatem in multis aliis dicimus esse, vellem scire 
an ubicumque veritas dicitur, deum eam esse fateri debeamus. Nam tu quoque in Monologio tuo per veritatem 
orationis probas summam veritatem non habere principium vel finem...Quapropter veritatis definitionem a 
te discere exspecto.
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beginning or end, which is the fi rst cause of this truth. Therefore, the truth of this state-
ment could not always exist if its cause did not always exist (De ver. 10.13-22.190).29
From both passages it is clear that Anselm sees his work on Truth as an 
argument for God being without beginning or end as unfinished because he has yet 
to define what he means by truth. Thus, in De veritate, Anselm does the philosophical 
“heavy-lifting” required to move from true statements to Truth in the mind of God or 
Supreme Truth.30 In the Monologion, Anselm alludes to the idea that true statements 
are only true through participation in the Supreme Truth, but in De veritate, he shows 
how this participation works at various levels.31 At the level of transcendent Eternity 
and the highest Truth, the one we are interested in, there can never be a beginning 
or ending of Truth even if true statements come into existence that were not there 
before. Anselm has tied together Augustinian arguments scattered throughout the 
Soliloquia to show two aspects of God’s Transcendent Eternity (without beginning 
or end) in one step, without appeal to too many other divine attributes.
 Through understanding what it means for Eternity to be Maximum, and 
through Anselm’s two arguments for God’s Eternity, the nature of God’s Transcendent 
Eternity has become clearer. God’s Eternity is without beginning or ending, but this 
aspect is not the sum of its nature because God’s nature is not merely something 
that He has but something that He is. Divine supremacy demands that Eternity is 
not something in which God participates. He is Eternity; in fact in De incarnatione 
Dei (1936), Anselm states, “God is not anything other than simple Eternity itself” 
(Deus non est aliud quam ipsa simplex aeternitas)(15.12.33).32 Divine simplicity 
implies that Eternity is intricately connected to his other attributes in such a way 
that one attribute can shed light upon another attribute. It can also be understood 
as unifying other attributes: immortality, immutability, and incorruptibility are three 
particularly related attributes. Truth in its unity and without-beginning-and-end-
ness is another attribute with which Eternity is particularly connected and by which 
Eternity can be made known. 
Transcendent Eternity made immanent: Seeking presence (Monologion 
19-23) 
What is true of transcendent Eternity must also be true of immanent Eternity. 
This identity must be the case because transcendent and immanent Eternity cannot 
be anything but one Eternity considered from separate perspectives. Anselm’s 
29 Unde iam intelligere potes quomodo summam veritatem in meo Monologio probavi non habere principium 
vel fi nem per veritatem orationis. Cum enim dixi, quando non fuit verum quia futurum erat aliquid, non ita 
dixi, ac si absque principio ista oratio fuisset quae asseret futurum esse aliquid, aut ista veritas esset deus; sed 
quoniam non potest intelligi quando, si oratio ista esset, veritas illi deesset. Ut per hoc quia non intelligitur, 
quando ista veritas esse non potuerit, si esset oratio in qua esse posset, intelligatur illa veritas sine principio 
fuisse, quae prima causa est huius veritatis. Quippe veritas orationis non semper posset esse, si eius causa 
non semper esset.
30 A nice summary of this argument has been made by Visser and Williams in (2004, p. 204-221, 216) “To argue 
that the supreme Truth is eternal is not to argue that some feature of statements is eternal, but that the cause 
of their truth is eternal. God is the supreme Truth because He is the cause of the truth of all other true things.”
31 Rogers comments on the nature of Anselm’s use of participation, claiming that it is platonic in an Augustinian 
way: “In De Veritate Anselm does not disagree when his interlocuter says that ‘nothing is true except by 
participating in Truth’ (Nihil est verum nisi participando veritatem S.I p.177, 11.16). Truth is not just a quality...
Qualities do not exist per se. Only one thing exists per se. Clearly the Truth in which all true things participate 
is God Himself” (Rogers, 1997, p. 95-96). Visser and Williams do not think that it is Platonic, making a 
distinction between Anselm’s handling of Truth and of Good, but they do agree that Truth is one in Anselm: 
“What exactly is it for something to ‘exist in’ or to ‘be a certain way in’ the supreme Truth?... (1)... things 
received their existence and their characteristics from God; (p. 2) ...what they received from God necessarily 
accords with his plan for them...there is rectitude in all things because all things accord with God’s plan for 
them. Whatever is is right” (2009, p. 48).
32 In this same passage, Anselm makes it clear that there are not many eternities within or without each other.
272
Filosofi a Unisinos, 11(3):261-286, set/dez 2010
Lesley-Anne Dyer
arguments for immanent Eternity bring out the inherent tension between God’s 
presence (which might be called immanence) and his transcendence. On the 
one hand, God must be transcendent in such a way that nothing is before him 
ontologically or chronologically.33  On the other hand, He not only creates the world, 
but through Him, all things are sustained: through this creating and sustaining 
presence, He is immanent.34 The imposition of the transcendence/immanence 
nomenclature may seem somewhat modern or anachronistic, but the conceptual 
shift within the text is real and appears to have been apparent to Anselm’s early 
readers. There appears to be a real shift in the text from the earlier chapters to 
Monologion 19-23.35 
The centrality of presence is important in the chapters on immanence in the 
Monologion and becomes even more pronounced in the Proslogion. One might say 
that Anselm examines the problem of presence as an intellectual challenge in the 
Monologion and wrestles with the problem of presence as a spiritual challenge in 
the Proslogion.36 The theme of divine presence can be found throughout Anselm’s 
works. In the Monologion, it is a question of the presence of the highest nature, 
33 Monologion 19 considers whether there is anything ante or post the divine substance. Like Augustine, 
Anselm answers that there is nihil before or after God, and highlights the absurdity of the way in which we 
often think of nihil as some thing by using personifi cation language. The fi rst example is at the beginning of the 
chapter: ecce iterum insurgit nihil (19.26.33); and a further example can be found in the middle of a passage: 
An potius repugnandum est nihilo, ne tot structurae necessariae rationis expugnentur a nihil? (19.11-14.34). 
Nihil is not an aliquid that can raise itself up! Neither does it have volition in its ability to destroy! But that is 
what our minds tend to think. This very Augustinian point is reminiscent of De magistro 2.3 where he points 
to the way in which assigning a word to nihil tends to make us think of it as something substantive. What is 
particularly unusual is the way Anselm connects this idea with the solution to the problem of ante/post found 
in Confessio 11.10-13, where Augustine makes the observation that time is itself a created thing: How could 
it be possible for something created to exist prior to its Creator? Ante/post implies a timeline but how could 
there be a timeline without time? By connecting this issue with the Augustinian distinction of nihil, Anselm 
makes this argument which is ultimately dependent upon the per se/per aliud idea of maximality into something 
that includes time, space, and all those things that are in time and space – thus all creation. Anselm is thus 
able to construct a solution by means of clarifying terms. Rather than nihil non fuit ante summam essentiam 
nec erit post illam (19.15-16.34) meaning priusquam summa essentia esset fuit cum erat nihil (19.20.34), it 
actually means ante summam essentiam non fuit aliquid (19.21-22). He, therefore, is defi ning nihil in the sense 
of non aliquid. Within the Latin, the absurdity of the thought becomes particularly apparent because of the 
juxtaposition of essentia esset fuit. The conception of an essence, whose very defi ning characteristic is being, 
not existing “in the past tense” is a nonsensical.
34 “Nothing was made except through the creative, present Being, so also nothing is sustained except through 
the preserving presence of this same Being.” (nihil factum est nisi per creatricem praesentem essentiam, ita nihil 
vigeat nisi per eiusdem servatricem praesentiam)(13.13-15.27). “It is in every place and time since it is absent 
from no place or time, and it is in no place or time since it has no place or time.”In omni loco et tempore est, 
quia nulli abest; et in nullo est, quia nullum locum aut tempus habet (22.7.41).
35 One can see this shift in Peter Lombard’s Sententia (c.1154-6), written about seventy years after Anselm’s 
work.(Lombard, 1971) In book 1, distinction 37, Lombard places many of the questions that concern Anselm 
under the heading of “In what ways God is said to be in things” (Quibus modis dicitur esse Deus in rebus), 
distinguishing it from his earlier consideration of in what way things are said to be in God (that is, God’s nature). 
Thus, the consideration of God’s presence within time [immanence] might teach us something about the 
Supreme Nature, but it is to be distinguished from the attributes of God, such as Eternity, per se [transcendence].
36 The two explicit and relevant references to presence in the Monologion are: Just two examples of this theme 
in the Proslogion: “Lord, if you are not here, where should I seek you, the absent one. If moreover you are 
everywhere, why do I not see you as present? But surely you inhabit light inaccessible. And where is light 
inaccessible? Or how should I draw near unto light inaccessible?” (Domine, si hic non es, ubi te quaeram 
absentem? Si autem ubique es, cur non video praesentem? Sed certe habitas “lucem inaccessibilem.” Et ubi 
est lux inaccessibilis? Aut quomodo accedam ad lucem inaccessibilem? (1.2-4.98). “O highest and inaccessible 
light, oh whole and blessed Truth, how far you are from me, who am so near to you! How removed you are 
from my gaze, who am so present to your gaze! Wherever you are, you are wholly present, and I do not see 
you. In you I move and have my being, and I cannot draw near to you. You are within me and around me, 
yet I sense it not.”O summa et inaccessibilis lux, o tota et beata veritas, quam longe es a me, qui tam prope 
tibi sum! Quam remota es a conspectu meo, qui sic praesens sum conspectui tuo! Ubique es tota praesens, 
et non te video. In te moveor et in te sum, et ad te non possum accedere. Intra me et circa me es, et non te 
sentio (16.27.112-4.113).
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but elsewhere, Anselm emphasizes the presence of certain aspects of this nature: 
Does divine presence mean the presence of Truth (De veritate), Power/Substance (De 
Incarnatione 7 and 15), or Sight/Perception/Knowledge (Proslogion)? Throughout 
his works, Anselm will emphasize that these various aspects are all present because 
they are all one nature; nevertheless, it does somewhat affect Anselm’s argument 
in the Monologion that he is speaking about the presence of the Highest Nature in 
creation, and therefore, the immanence of the Highest Eternity in place and time. 
Consideration of immanent Eternity sheds light upon transcendent Eternity 
through inherent similitudes within creation, and yet, it also preserves the mystery 
of the transcendent through the negation of certain spatio-temporal assumptions 
when applied to God. In the context of Monologion 19ff., these similitudes, and 
their transcendent alterity, can be found in the very categories of our speech and 
understanding. At heart, Anselm’s clarity and contribution to this discussion, which 
was begun by Augustine and continued by Boethius, is his recognition that presence 
normally implies containment. Part of Anselm’s ability to identify this confusion 
inherent in metaphors comes from his strong connection between place and time: 
he logically applies some of Boethius’ observations concerning place to similar 
situations concerning time. This recognition of the limitation of the word “presence” 
is an important conceptual progression of the Augustinian-Boethian project. While 
“presence” is not a category, it underlies several categories. The latent valences 
of “containment” within37 “presence” can cause conceptual misunderstanding of 
predication when they are not identified. While Burrell and Leftow have suggested 
something similar to this, I believe that this contribution starts in the Monologion 
and has not been generally appreciated for its importance. I would argue that 
Anselm takes the kernels of his argument in the Monologion and develops these 
seeds in later works. This development would contradict Leftow’s assertions that 
Anselm abandoned omnipresence in the Monologion only to recover it later through 
a reverse-containment thesis. Anselm’s conceptual continuation of Augustinian and 
Boethian thought has major implications for how Eternity is understood to be both 
transcendent and immanent within Time. 
Anselm’s Boethian sources for theorizing 
the nature of immanent Eternity
Anselm gets clear distinctions concerning Unity, Trinity, and the Ten Categories 
from Boethius’ De Trinitate (1968). He develops these distinctions further, taking 
Boethian observations concerning “containment” and Place, and applying them to 
Time. This application is characteristic of Anselm’s general approach to place and 
time, seeing that which applies to one as applying to another.
Boethius addresses the way all of the various categories must be adjusted 
when applied to God’s substance, and he mostly follows the Aristotelian order 
of the ten categories. These ten categories are divided into intrinsic and extrinsic 
(4.78-108). The intrinsic categories are substance (substantia; particular and 
universal), quality (qualitas; kind) and quantity (quantitas; number). Boethius 
begins by observing that predicates change when applied to God and that God 
37 While normally prepositions such as “in” or “within” can be used somewhat interchangeably, I will prefer 
the term “within” throughout this paper because it is in line with Anselm’s point about in meaning more 
appropriately cum. He had only two prepositional choices. We have three.
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himself is above substance (ultra substantiam)(4.7-11).38 Normally, there are 
two kinds of substances. A primary substance is a particular thing, like Socrates. 
These cannot be predicated of or said to be in anything. A secondary substance 
is a universal, like man. These can be predicated of something: Socrates is 
a man. When intrinsic categories are applied to God, they are substantive, 
whereas normally, with things that are not God, only the category of substance 
is substantive. This substantive use of all these categories comes about because 
God is sua propria. To say that God is above or more than substance (ultra 
substantiam) means that although Socrates is not simply a man, God is simply 
God. This unique nature of God’s substance means that there is convertibility 
between substance and the quality as applied to God. God is just but he is also 
Justice because the quality of just in God is also a substance. When quantity is 
applied to God, it refers to his greatness(magnus) or best (maximum). This means 
two things. First, God’s greatness or Maximum is that he is above substance. 
Second, God’s form is utterly unified such that his qualities are his substance. 
Clearly, this understanding of quantity as applied to God is one of the strongest 
influences upon Anselm’s idea of God as Maximum, and this passage is one of 
the best justifications for translating summa as Maximum.
The extrinsic categories are relation (ad aliquid; the way one object is to 
another), place (ubi; where), time (quando; when), situation (situm esse; being-in-a 
position or the relation of different parts of a being to another), action (facere; 
doing), state (habere; having), passivity (pati; being affected). These extrinsic 
categories are more difficult to modify:
(i) Situation and Passivity do not apply at all to God (4.97-98). 
(ii)  Place applies in the sense that God is everywhere, but this word needs 
some modification to be fully understood. 
(iii)  Time applies in the sense that God is “always,” but this term also requires 
explanation. 
(iv)  Boethius says little about State and Action, except to say that they are 
extrinsic. God may be said to hold all things (cuncta possidens), which is 
a state, or to rule (regit), which is an action, but these all relate to things 
outside of God. They are not internal to Him.
(v)  Not following the traditional ordering, Boethius saves the full treatment 
of the category of Relation to the very end because this final category is 
the most important for discussing the Trinity, which is the primary subject 
of his treatise. The Trinity is a relation that is intrinsic to God. 
Of all the extrinsic categories, Boethius’ discussion of Place and Time must 
be examined here in more detail.
When discussing the category of Place, Boethius introduces the problems of 
containment but does not adjust prepositions (from in to cum) as Anselm does: 
For it seems to be said that He is “everywhere” (ubique), not because he is 
in every place (in omni loco) (for he cannot be in a place at all) but because every 
place is present to him insofar as He contains (capiendum) it, although he himself 
is not contained (suscipiatur) in any place; and therefore he is said never to be in a 
place, since he is “everywhere” but not “in any place” (4.54-59).39
38 While one might argue that Boethius defi nes ultra substantiam in a unique way, he is borrowing the phrase 
itself from the Neoplatonic tradition.
39 Nam quod ubique est ita dici videtur non quod in omni sit loco (omnino enim in loco esse non potest) sed 
quod omnis ei locus adsit ad eum capiendum, cum ipse non suscipiatur in loco; atque ideo nusquam in loco 
esse dicitur, quoniam ubique est sed non in loco.
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Following the Boethian model, Anselm will also discuss omnipresence in terms 
of everywhere and in every place, elaborating more thoroughly upon his observations 
concerning containment and then applying them to his discussion of Time. 
Concerning the category of Time, Boethius – like Augustine before him and 
Anselm after him – says that God’s “when” (quando) is more appropriately called 
“always” (semper):
But what is said of God (he is “always”) signifi es only one thing, that in some way, he 
would have been to everything past, is to everything present (in whatever way this term 
should be used) and will be to everything future. What could be said of the heavens 
and other heavenly (immortal) bodies according to the philosophers could not be said 
of God. For He is “always,” since “always” belongs to the present in a point of time. 
And there is so much difference between the present of our affairs (nostrarum rerum 
praesens), which is now, and the present of divine affairs (divinarum),40 because our 
“now,” as if running, produces time and sempiternity, but the divine “now,” enduring, 
not moving itself, and standing still, makes Eternity. To which name [eternity], if you 
were to attach “always” (semper), you would make this “now” that is continual and 
unfailing, and thereby, a perpetual course, i.e. “sempiternity” (4.64-77).41
Sorabji (1983, p. 116) rightly observes that three distinctions can be found in this 
passage: the distinction between the eternal and the temporal “now,” the distinction 
between the eternal and the temporal “always,” and the distinction between eternity 
and sempiternity. The first and last of these distinctions are not to be found in Anselm’s 
Monologion, and thus, will not be discussed here. What is most important for Anselm 
is how “always,” along with past, present, and future, applies to God. It may also 
be noticed that the Anselmian questions of omnipresence and omni-temporality do 
not seem to be the primary concern for Boethius. Rather, Boethius is more interested 
in discussing the category of Time as it distinguishes between divine and temporal 
substance, not the interaction of divine and temporal substances. 
Defining time, simultaneity, and containment
Anselm’s understanding of immanence, simultaneity, and containment 
depends upon his notions of place and time. Although it is not possible to give 
a full account of Anselm’s conceptions of time, simultaneity, and containment, a 
sketch can be given here, based upon Anselm’s likely sources.
Anselm’s conception of time and place would have probably been shaped 
by Aristotle’s Categoriae in the translation and commentary by Boethius (1961). 
From these texts, he would have learned that time and place can be classified as 
continuous quantities, similar to the way lines and solids are measured. Geometric 
metaphors are central to the Aristotelian/Boethian explanations of both place 
and time, and underlying most of these geometric explanations is the Euclidean 
40 The plural nature of divine rerum ought be examined further because it might have implications for the 
nature of divine action and nature, which normally ought to be considered a unity. It would be more neatly 
translated as “our now” and the “divine now” but that is not what is written.
41 Quod vero de deo dicitur “semper est,”unum quidem significant, quasi omni praeterito fuerit, omni quoquo 
modo sit praesenti est, omni futuro erit. Quod de caelo et de ceteris inmortalibus corporibus secundum 
philosophos dici potest, at de deo non ita. Semper enim est, quoniam “semper” praesentis est in eo temporis 
tantumque inter nostrarum rerum praesens, quod est nunc, interest ac divinarum quod nostrum “nunc” quasi 
currens tempus facit et sempiternitatem, divinum vero “nunc” permanens neque movens sese atque consistens 
aeternitatem facit; cui nomini si adicias “semper,” facies eius quod est nunc iugem indefessumque ac per hoc 
perpetuum cursum quod est sempiternitas.
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definition of a point (punctus) as that “of which there are no parts” (cuius pars 
nulla est), which would have been available to Anselm either through Boethian 
quotation or Isiodore (Etym. 3.12.7).42 Just as a point of place is best understood 
as a common boundary that has no real measurement, so a present point of time 
can be understood through the relative order of its “parts,” which themselves have 
no abiding existence. Boethius explains that these parts can be understood as the 
past, present, and future: “For when the parts of time are the past and future, the 
present time is the common boundary of these, for of one there is an end and of 
the other a beginning. Place also consists of continuous parts” (Nam cum sint partes 
temporis praeteritum et futurum, horum praesens tempus communis est terminus, 
huius namque finis est, illius initium. Locus quoque continuorum) (PL 205D). Larger 
“chunks” of time or place are referred to as space or spatio. 
Anselm would have also been able to get a definition of simul from these same 
Aristotelian/Boethian texts. In them, Aristotle observes and Boethius comments that 
there are three kinds of simultaneity: simul simpliciter which is according to the same 
time (secundum idem tempus), simul naturaliter according to causation, and simul 
naturaliter according to genus and difference. God would fit all definitions of simul 
more perfectly than any other thing. Normally, with simul naturaliter according to genus 
and species, there is no convertibility: Socrates is a man, but not all men are Socrates; 
however, God is God, and as was shown when discussing the logic of simplicity, there is 
a convertibility of his substance/attributes because they are uniquely simple. In the case 
of simul naturaliter according to causation, there is always a natural hierarchy: the father 
causes the son even though there can be no father without a son or son without a father. 
By contrast, God is from himself, and thus exists simul causally without hierarchy. Finally, 
simul simpliciter usually entails two things/actions at one time. Immanently speaking, 
and this is the context in which Anselm normally speaks of God’s simultaneity (which 
is why it is mentioned here and not before), God’s nature as simul simpliciter entails 
only God’s existence as a whole at all times. The plurality is in the creation (although 
it might be considered from the standpoint of the present unity), and the unity in the 
Creator. Transcendentally speaking, one might also say that God is simultaneous with 
his “time,” Eternity, which is itself one. This simultaneity would resemble the Stump-
Kretzmann “E-simultaneity” although to speak in such a way may be misleading. God 
is whole at the Eternal present while also being Eternity. Thus, Anselm’s conclusion 
that God is simul tota means four things: (i) God is from himself and without hierarchy 
within himself, (ii) God is his Nature, (iii) God is present as a whole at all times (immanent 
meaning), and (iv) God is a whole at his eternal present, which for him is the same as 
being his Eternity (transcendent meaning).
With these various definitions in mind, the geometrical language of Aristotle 
and Boethius, which is based upon relation and measurement, does not necessarily 
imply containment although one can speak of Aristotelian container theories of time. 
It might be that underlying Anselm’s idea of a time and space as a “container” is 
the Augustinian idea that time and space are created and had a beginning.43 The 
creatability of time and place appears to imply that they are not merely relations 
although it is very unlikely that he would have thought of them as substances (or 
a four-dimensional substance-like thing).44 
42 There was a revival of Euclid in the Twelfth Century that began with the Norman conquest of Messina in 
1060, but it is unlikely and unnecessary that Anselm would have needed to be aware of this importation of 
new texts. See (Busard, 1987).
43 If this was not known to Anselm through the Confessions, it might have been known through his Tract. in 
Ioh. 38.4.17-20.340.
44 The difficulty of describing time and place as quasi-substantive or as relation probably has roots in the 
inherently difficult nature of the Timaean notion of receptacle.
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There is one final aspect of Time as Anselm would have understood it that 
may be somewhat foreign to modern understandings of it, that is, the locus of 
wholeness. In his reply to Gaunilo, Anselm states that although time exists always, 
it does not exist always as a whole because it can only exist always partitively (cap. 
1). Such a unification of times into a Time seems rather vague to non-existent. We 
might infer from Anselm’s De Grammatico 21 that times at their very least have 
categorical unity. In that text, Anselm tentatively (realizing that there was debate 
on the matter) concludes that the predication of the quality “having-whiteness” is 
identical with “white.” Time, as another category, might be said to have categorical 
unity in a similar fashion. Exactly how this might look is difficult to say and gets at 
questions of realism and nominalism (does time exist only in temporal things or 
outside of them as well?) that it would be difficult to address here, assuming (which 
is difficult) that there is enough writing of Anselm on this matter. This categorical 
unity, whatever it is, should be distinguished from the unity of Platonic participation 
discussed earlier within the context of Truth because Truth is God in a way that a 
predicate and the thing that possesses that predicate is not. While at that point 
in the argument the focus was upon the everlastingness of Supreme Truth, the 
argument can be made in reverse: those things that truly exist in time have a unity 
and wholeness in Truth itself. The truth that time exists in some way gives a unity 
to it through participation in Truth. This point can be made without recourse to the 
divine ideas, although such things would have been familiar to Anselm.
With all of these aspects of time in mind, what then did Anselm mean by 
containment? First, the ability to contain would have nothing to do with how “large” 
space and time were. An infinite place and time would still be too “small” if they 
were created by God. Even if such an infinite place and time were not substantive 
and were still more akin to co-ordinates on a grid or matrix, this “grid,” which is 
nothing in itself, is still in some sense created by God. Seen from this perspective, 
the laws or rules governing the grid do not apply to the one creating these laws or 
rules. He is therefore not contained or bound by them. Second, within the context 
of geometry, time and place allow measurement when conceived of as points laid 
side by side, extended as lines or shapes. God’s Eternity conceived as a point is 
immeasurable because no matter how many points are laid on top of one another, 
they are still one point and therefore immeasurable (De incarn., 15). At a minimum 
when Anselm says in other places that Eternity is outside of time (De process., 
2.200.3), this means that transcendentally He cannot be measured by continuous 
quantity, and immanently He cannot be subject to the laws of place and time. 
Finally, there are implications for what was said about the nature of predication and 
participation. Time as a categorical unity can in no way “contain” God because the 
category was created by God. At a minimum, time or things in time can be said to 
be contained by God in the way that they exist “enfolded” in his Truth (as well as 
in his ideas) and that they have existence that participates in that Truth. It appears 
that in the sections in the Monologion about to be analysed, Anselm is at the very 
least denying a divine obligation for God to obey the normal rules of his created 
order. He can be simultaneously whole at all times and places. Times and places 
are not ways of measuring him or his Eternity. It is also possible that Anselm was 
thinking of containment in a somewhat physical sense: the world’s time and place 
as being within an invisible, infinite geometric box which is too small for him. This 
latter possibility can be conceived as a matter of linguistic metaphor (latent within 
words like “in”) or as a physical reality.
One final caveat lector: It is also important to remember that neither Leibniz’s 
nor Newton’s view exactly corresponds to Anselm’s view. Certain modern theories 
of time, such as Leibniz’s idea of time as relation, might find the language of 
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“containment” somewhat unintelligible because the question might arise: “contained 
by what?”. Aristotelian container theories, which Anselm may have known indirectly 
at least, see place and time as a kind of relation. Although Leibniz also saw time as 
a relation, he very firmly believed that it was not a substance. The difficulty, which 
will not be solved here, lies in the rather sticky metaphysical questions of whether 
there are multiple kinds of being (and further historical questions of how ousia came 
to be translated as substance which now has connotations of individual being). Is 
relation a kind of being? 
 Minimally speaking, “containment” can be considered a mere metaphor: 
there is no literal substance that is a container. Rather, it is an idea that helps convey 
limitation to a particular time or place. It is possible, however, to conceive of time 
and place as having a degree of being because it was created. Aristotle believed that 
time was a real thing that can be measured (as well as something perceived by the 
mind). Leibniz, on the other hand, considered time to be an ideal, not in the sense 
of a metaphysical reality but instead an illegitimate perception. For Leibniz, God 
is not bound by time or place because He can see that concepts such as time and 
place are illusory. Plato, Augustine, and in all likelihood, Anselm believed time to be 
a created thing and thus a metaphysical reality – not illusions. Anselm would not 
have struggled so hard to see how God could be both transcendent and immanent 
in time if time ultimately were illusory. Does this mean that containment implied a 
container for Anselm, making his theory closer to Newton’s substantive time? It is 
very hard to say, especially if Anselm was familiar with the Latin Timaean tradition 
of the receptacle. This would also depend upon the Newtonian and Anselmian 
definitions of substance, which must be a topic for another time.
How Eternity can be immanent with time: 
Avoiding containment through “Always” 
(Monologion 20-23)
How exactly does Anselm reason out the nature of God’s presence within time 
and place, concluding with Boethius and Augustine that God’s where is “everywhere” 
(where), and more importantly for this investigation, that his when is “always”? What 
steps does he take and what sources does he use? Anselm analyzes the problem 
under four headings: whether this Supreme Being is in every place and time (cap. 
20), whether it is in no place or time (cap. 21), how it exists in every and in no 
place and time (cap. 22), and how it is better to understand it to be “always” than 
in every time (cap. 23). At the outset, there appeared to be only two possibilities: 
either God is in every place and time, or he is not. Anselm then showed that both 
must be true because to deny these propositions would imply either that God is 
not whole at the same time or that space and time are not stretched out into parts. 
The Anselmian turn comes at the end, when he recognizes that presence normally 
implies containment, but in the case of the divine, it does not. First, he will point out 
that instead of in, one should say cum, applying a Boethian distinction concerning 
both place and time. Better still, one ought instead to say “always,” as Augustine 
does in De civitate Dei (1955) and Boethius does in De Trinitate. Anselm will end 
by applying his conclusions through a consideration of the Boethian definition of 
Eternity as found in the Consolatio.
Anselm may have derived the ideas of God’s knowledge viewing temporal 
things in his simultaneous present and of God’s immanent presence in time as 
“always” primarily from Augustine’s De civitate Dei. In this work, Augustine writes 
that God’s intention (intentio) does not “pass from thought to thought” (de 
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cogitatione in cogitationem transit): “in his incorporeal vision, all things which 
he knows are present simultaneously” (in cuius incorporeo contuitu simul adsunt 
cuncta quae novit) (11.21.27-29). The mystery of such knowledge is compared 
to God’s movement of temporal things without “temporal motion of his own” 
(nullis suis temporalibus motibus) (11.21.31). Past, present, and future things are 
comprehended by God’s vision in his completely stable and sempiternal present 
(omnia stabili ac sempiterna praesentia).45 Augustine does not elaborate the structure 
of time in this passage although he might do so in the Confessions.46 What is more 
important to him is the preservation of the Eternity of God’s life and action. This 
two-fold aspect of God’s Eternity becomes clearer in the next important passage 
from the City of God, which distinguishes between the interaction of God and the 
angels with the world.
Augustine also addresses the nature of God’s “always” (semper) in De civitate 
Dei 12.16 to explain why angels are not co-eternal with God. As will be seen, the 
term “always” will play a very important role in Anselm’s argument for the nature 
of God’s omnipresence. Augustine explains that Angels exist “always” in that they 
exist “in all time” (omni tempore) and “before all time” (ante tempora)(12.16.33-
34). “They were made together with time,” which has itself existed in all time (omni 
tempore fuit tempus)(12.16.56), and “without them, time would by no means have 
been possible” (sine quibus tempora nullo modo esse potuerunt) (12.16.83).47 Unlike 
the angels, however, God has always existed “in an immutable Eternity” (aeternitate 
inmutabili). In the same passage, Augustine also gives a definition of time, which may 
have been influential for Anselm: Time is that which is indicated “by some changing 
motion, one part of which occurs earlier and another later because they cannot exist 
simultaneously in [time]” (In aliquo mutabili motu, cuius aliud prius, aliud posterius 
praeterit, eo quod simul esse non possunt)(12.16.41-43). Thus, while the immortality of 
the angels (inmortalitas angelorum) is outside of time, their motion (eorum motus) not 
only produces time but also passes through it (12.16.85-90). This distinction between 
angelic immortality and angelic motion is the basis for Augustine’s conclusion that the 
angels cannot be coeternal (coaeterni) with God. Thus, God’s Eternity or “always” is 
held to be unique to Him. It is clearly transcendent and does not act in the same way 
within time that the angelic hosts do. It is less clear how God’s immanence is to be 
understood in Augustine. God has knowledge/vision of all time in his transcendent 
Eternity, and he uses the angels to work his will in his temporal creation through 
action. It is less clear in what way God’s being is present to his creation. By contrast, 
Anselm will emphasize that all of these aspects (being, knowledge, sight, action) of 
God are present in some way in the world.
Monologion 20-24 should be read as an exploration of how a transcendent 
God can be present to his creation. This presence includes both place and time. The 
first question that Anselm considers is whether the divine substance is in every place 
and time. It is self-evidently Maximum for God to exist ubique and semper because 
45 While it is tempting to translate this sempiternal as merely equivalent to “eternal,” there may be grounds for 
assuming these terms are not exactly synonyms. Consider for example Augustine’s compression of names in 
De Trinitate 15: eternal as a combination of immortal, incorruptible, and unchangeable. This may be a similar 
compression: [stable (incorruptible/unchangeable) and sempiternal (immortal) present] = eternity.
46 While one could find similar passages about God’s knowledge in the Confessions, it is not clear whether 
Anselm had access to this work. In fact, the confusion in the secondary literature concerning Anselm’s theory 
of time may be a result of Anselm’s lack of access to this text. In Confessions 11.18, Augustine admits that he is 
unsure whether God sees the future as the present (implying that they exist already in some way although not 
to us – a four- dimensional time) or whether God merely sees the signs or causes of future things (a Molinistic 
view of God’s foreknowledge). This discussion is absent from the City of God and also from Anselm’s own work.
47 The meaning of this passage is made clearer when Augustine later elaborates that the movement of the 
angels produces time (12.16.87-88).
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the other two options of existing nowhere and never or some places and some times 
are patently less (20.11.35). Given Anselm’s earlier arguments, it is impossible for 
the One who exists supremely and most truly to not exist. It is also impossible for 
the One without which “absolutely nothing exists” to be limited in place or time. 
The reason for the impossibility is twofold: (i) The Maximum cannot be limited, 
and (ii) No essence can exist without the sustaining of the Maximum. From this 
line of reasoning it can be seen that the principle of Maximum that permeates the 
Monologion motivates Anselm to uphold God’s immanence. God must exist in all 
times and places because to be anything less would be to deny that God is Maximum.
And yet, with his beginning remarks, “I sense the murmuring of contradiction 
(sentio […] contradictionis summurmurare) (20.10.35), it is clear that Anselm recognizes 
that saying God exists in omni loco vel tempore does not represent the whole truth of 
God’s Being. For all of this hesitance, he shows that prima facie there are only three 
logical options concerning God’s relationship with place and time: He is at all (omni), 
some (aliquo), or no (nullo) places and times (20.11-13.35). Another kind of reasoning, 
however, beckons him to consider how God cannot exist in all times and places.
Anselm breaks the concept in omni loco vel tempore into possible meanings 
and evaluates their truth or falsehood. Even here the language of Eternity does 
not immediately enter the conversation although the accompanying language of 
Eternity, in the sense of whole and part, does. The first question is whether God 
exists as a whole or part in place and time. Because God is not in parts (something 
established when considering his transcendent Eternity) He cannot exist as a part in 
place and time. How would this whole exist in place and time? Would it be a whole 
divided throughout the parts of place and time? Or does it exist as a whole in the 
sum of all things and in their individual parts? Anselm breaks this question further 
into how the latter could be true with respect primarily to place or time individually. 
He encounters difficulty when he cannot have something be whole in two places 
at one time. When reversing the question, it also becomes clear that something 
cannot remain whole by being in one place at different times.
His final difficulty with time comes in chapter twenty-one when he addresses 
whether God is in no place or time and whether he can be whole throughout past, 
present, and future. Division into any parts whatsoever denies the very definition 
of the divine substance and Eternity as being “simultaneously whole” (simul tota). 
Anselm decides to split his consideration of time and place into two different lines. 
It is at his discussion of time that Eternity is introduced. That which is stretched 
out into parts, by definition, is temporal. That which is simultaneously whole is by 
definition eternal; this unity was something established when considering God as 
Transcendent Maximum in early chapters. How can Eternity exist in time? Much less, 
how can it exist in time as a whole? 
Anselm’s method of reasoning follows a dialectical line until it reaches a place 
where only one thing can be the case and yet it appears to be nonsense to try to 
assert this same thing to be the case. In chapter twenty-two, he begins to look for 
another way that would allow both to be true: 
Perhaps in some way the Highest Nature exists in place and time in a way 
which does not prevent it from existing in a manner that is simultaneously whole in 
individual places or times, such that nevertheless they are not many parts of wholes 
but only one whole. Neither is his lifetime, which is nothing if not true eternity, not 
distributed into past, present, and future (22.4-8.39).48 
48 Fortasse quodam modo est summa natura in loco vel tempore, quo non prohibetur sic esse simul tota in 
singulis locis vel temporibus, ut tamen non sint plures totae sed una sola tota, nec eius aetas, quae non est 
nisi vera aeternitas, non sit distributa in praeteritum, praesens et futurum.
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He begins to realize that only things that cannot transcend the space of place 
or the duration of time can be limited by the same: “For only those things which exist 
in place or time in such way that they do not go beyond the extent of place or the 
span of time are bound by the law of place and the law of time” (22.8-10.39).49 That 
which is neither subject to the laws of place and time, nor contained therein, cannot 
be overcome by the same: “No law of place or of time in any way restricts a nature 
which place and time do not at all confine by any containment” (Nulla igitur lex loci 
aut temporis naturam ullam aliquomodo cogit, quam nullus locus ac tempus aliqua 
continentia claudit)(22.23-25.39). Through reason, Anselm derives a conception of 
Eternity that is neither atemporal (because Anselm considers Eternity to be with time) 
nor temporally bound (because he considers Eternity to be outside of time). 
His next step is to return to the language used and explain how it accurately 
describes the situation as long as the words take on special meaning for the case 
at hand. He distinguishes temporal creatures, who are present and bound in time, 
from the Supreme Essence, who is present with time, but not bound by its laws: “it 
is present, even because it is not contained (praesens est, non etiam quia continetur) 
(22.32-33.40). Thus, a more accurate description is to say that the Supreme Being is 
“with place or time rather than in place or time” (cum loco vel tempore quam in loco 
vel tempore) (22.2.41). It is “absent” from no space or time and yet it has no place in 
either. In fact, the Supreme Nature contains all things by means of its omnipresence 
(cap. 23).50 By the implications of the logic of simplicity, this containing aspect of 
the Supreme Nature implies that Eternity contains all things at all times.51 Anselm 
appears satisfied to leave the problem here once he has (i) identified the possible 
contradiction; (ii) shown the limitations of our language in describing the Supreme 
Being; and (iii) resolved the problem so as to show no necessary contradiction. 
Anselm’s use of the Boethian definition 
(Monologion 24)
Under the heading of “how the Supreme Being can better be understood to 
exist always than to exist at every time” (quomodo melius intelligi posit esse semper 
quam in omni tempore), Anselm ends his discussion of transcendent and immanent 
Eternity with a reference to the Boethian “definition” as found in the Consolatio 
(2000): “What else is true eternity, appropriate for the Supreme Being alone, other 
than illimitable life, existing simultaneously and absolutely perfectly?”(quid aliud est 
vera aeternitas quae illi soli convenit, quam interminabilis vita simul et perfecte tota 
49 Non enim videntur hac lege loci ac temporis cogi nisi ea quae sic sunt in loco vel tempore, ut loci spatium 
aut temporis diuturnitatem non excedant.
50 Verum cum constet eandem summam naturam non magis esse in omnibus locis quam in omnibus quæ sunt, 
non velut quæ contineatur, sed quæ penetrando cuncta contineat.
51 In later works, Anselm says explicitly that God is pure Eternity (De Incarnatione 15), and that Eternity 
contains and yet is beyond all time (Pros. 19-20). It also contains by extension, one aeon or more than one 
aeon, depending upon perspective (if we can conceive of aeons as units or whole-nesses of time)(Pros. 21). 
De concordia 1.5 has the most extensive discussion of this containment of the whole of time by the eternal 
present. As was mentioned earlier, there are two primary interpretations of what model of time appears to 
be implied by this passage: Anselmian presentism or four-dimensionalism. While I will not attempt here to 
adjudicate between the two choices, it might be helpful to assert the reality of perspectivalism. There are two 
perspectives within Anselm’s system: God and creatures. God’s perspective is the closest to the “objective” 
perspective sought by modern philosophy, but perhaps it is not equivalent to this objective perspective. This 
lack of equivalence is not a lack in the Godhead: rather, it is an affirmation that God has created creatures that 
have real being and thus perspective apart from himself. His condescension in incarnation affirms the reality, 
validity and value of this perspective. In this way, the perspective of a being that flows through time is a real 
perspective because that being has been given agency, even while the Eternal divine perspective is also real.
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existens?)(24.23-25). In this one small chapter elaborating God’s “always,” no more 
than fifteen lines, Anselm ties together insights from both De Trinitate’s (1968) and 
De Civitate Dei (1955) with his earlier insights on the transcendent nature of Eternity. 
Like De Trinitate, the Consolatio is rich with conceptions of Eternity and Time, 
but its most profound contribution upon later authors, including Anselm, must be 
the “definition” of Eternity: “Eternity, then, is the simultaneously whole and perfect 
possession of limitless life” (5.6.9-11).52 This definition ought to be considered 
within its full context:
And so, it is the common judgment of all who live by reason that God is 
eternal. Therefore, let us consider what Eternity is because this reveals to us both 
the divine nature (naturam) and knowledge (scientiam). Eternity, then, is the whole 
and perfect possession of limitless life simultaneously, which becomes clearer by 
comparison with temporal things. For whatever lives in time, being in the present, 
proceeds from the past to the future. And there is nothing fixed in time that can 
embrace equally the whole span of its life. But indeed it [a temporal thing] does 
not grasp tomorrow, and now it has lost yesterday. Also in this present life, you do 
not live more than in this moving and fleeting moment (5.6.5-18).53
Two relevant influences upon Anselm ought to be noted from this passage. 
First, the premise of Anselm’s Monologion builds upon the idea that it is the common 
judgment of all living that God is eternal – and more, that God is the Maximum. 
Its exercise in reason attempts to show exactly how this could be the case. Second, 
the Eternity of God refers to his nature, unity of life, and knowledge. 
Because Eternity is God’s Life, contrary to some current philosophical 
conceptions, Eternity cannot be a matrix or dimension that God inhabits. It is God’s 
substance, as all the attributes may said to be within a theology of divine simplicity. 
The centrality of Life within Boethius’ definition also precludes characterizations of 
atemporal Eternity as static being. Insofar as it is “static” or “atemporal,” it is so 
because it lacks the drawbacks that are associated with Time. Life in time is a being 
that seems to verge on nothing – a point that barely seems like anything when the 
past is lost and the future is not yet. Insofar as life in time appears whole, it must 
be gathered from an extension of time (which barely seems to exist). Eternal Life 
has none of these drawbacks.54
52 Of course, there can be no defi nition, in the word’s medieval sense, of Eternity because defi nitions ascribe 
boundaries to things by placing them into categories and God cannot be categorized in comparison to anything 
but himself, and yet, Boethius’ description is one of the best and most memorable.
53 Deum igitur aeternum esse cunctorum ratione degentium commune iudicium est. Quid sit igitur aeternitas 
consideremus; haec enim nobis naturam pariter divinam scientiamque pategacit. Aeternitas igitur est 
interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio, quod ex collatione temporalium clarius liquet. Nam quidquid 
vivit in tempore id praesens a praeteritis in futura procedit nihilque est in tempore constitum quod totum vitae 
suae spatium pariter posit amplecti. Sed crastinum quidem nondum adprehendit, hesternum vero iam perdidit; 
in hodierna quoque vita non amplius vivitis quam in illo mobili transitorioque momento.
54 Finally, just after giving this definition, Boethius refutes the idea of the world’s co-eternity with God, from 
both an Aristotelian and Platonic perspective. Since the issue with co-eternity (rather than Eternity) is equality, 
we can learn a lot about the unique nature of God’s Eternity through this Boethian comparison. Boethius 
does not consider Aristotle’s extension of infinite time to be eternal because the past and future barely exist 
(5.6.18-22). God’s Eternity, in comparison, “stands as a whole, always present to itself and holds the infinity 
of moving time as a present” (5.6.29-31). Neither does Boethius think that Plato’s world without beginning 
or end is co-eternal with God because the property of boundless life is a property of the divine mind and not 
of the world (5.6.35-38). In addition, God is older than the world (antiquior) not by a certain amount of time 
but by his simplicity of nature (5.6.38-40). In this sense, even if God were to always be creating and sustaining 
a world, the nature of that world’s extended being is enough to make that world’s time not equal to God’s 
eternity. God is older, not just by being “before” or older in respect of origin (whether or not there was a 
“when” before God created the world) but he is even before in respect to the nature of his being. Boethius’ 
series of comparisons are not on a scale: more time or beginning earlier. The divine nature is not just better on a 
scale of comparison with other beings. It is better or “older” by its own nature, which no created thing cannot 
equal. This simplicity of nature is exactly where we must now look for our understanding of Eternity in Anselm.
283
Filosofi a Unisinos, 11(3):261-286, set/dez 2010
Transcendent and Immanent Eternity in Anselm’s Monologion
In the first sentence of chapter twenty-four, Anselm ties together the insights 
from the earlier chapters: “This Highest Substance exists (cap. 1) without beginning 
and without end (cap. 2) neither does it have a past or a future, nor a time, which 
is the fleeting present as we experience it, since its lifetime (aetas), or eternity, 
which is nothing other than itself, is unchanging and without parts”(Monologion 
24.12-14.42).55 The first qualification was established by the Augustinian proofs for 
Transcendent Eternity. The second one was established in the chapters discussing 
Immanent Eternity: it ties together Boethian (De Trinitate) insights about God being 
in all past, present, and future but having a unique “now” with the arguments from 
the earlier chapters on God being in and not in all times. 
The foundation for this unique interaction with time and times is the utter 
wholeness of the Supreme Substance, such that its lifetime (aetas) is unchanging and 
undivided. This wholeness provides the foundation for Anselm’s argument that “always” 
more appropriately applies to God than to time.56 As was mentioned previously, divine 
immanence is closely related to causation and temporal similitude. “Always” (like 
“lifetime”) is normally used to describe the relative wholeness of time, but God is utterly 
a unity in a way that time never can be.57 Thus, “always” applies more appropriately to 
the Highest Nature than to time, even though it is normally used within the context of 
time. Anselm’s use of the term “always” resembles Boethius usage in the De Trinitate to 
mean that God is in all past, present and future but neither contained by it nor running 
through it. It also resembles Augustine’s usage in De Civitate Dei 12 to compare the 
“always” of God and the “always” of the angels. Angels exist in all times and before 
all times, but God is uncreated and immutable. Therefore, his simultaneity is perfect.
From this summary and its introduction of “life,” Anselm shifts to incorporate 
another element of Augustine’s De Trinitate 15: recognizing the equivalence of life 
and being in God. Anselm continues applying this logic of simplicity to further assert 
that God is Eternity, which is his Life. This series of equivalences has the effect of 
Anselm adding an existens to Boethius’ definition: interminabilis vita simul et perfecte 
tota existens. While it is subtle, and clearly rooted in an Augustinian idea not at odds 
with the Boethian definition, it inserts a slight change of emphasis by placing the 
natures in relation. Humans often think of their life as that which changes, even if 
it has a certain wholeness in its totality, and their being as that which has relative 
stability. When one considers the divine nature, the unchanging dynamism of life 
is forever linked with an absolute stability. This wholly unextended Life-Being has 
no beginning, comes from itself, and does not end. 
55 Eandem...summam substantiam...sine principio et fi ne esse, nec habere praeteritum aut futurum, nec 
temporale, hoc est labile praesens quo nos utimur; quoniam ætas sive æternitas eius, quæ nihil aliud est quam 
ipsa, immutabilis et sine partibus est.
56 “Therefore, if “always,” which seems to signify the whole of time, this word is said much more truly about 
the Supreme Substance. It is understood to signify eternity, which is never dissimilar to itself, more than it is 
understood to apply to the variations of time, which are not always similar to themselves in anything. Thus, if 
it is said always to exist, since it is the same thing for it to be or to live, nothing is understood better than to 
be or live eternally. That is, to possess the whole illimitable life perfectly, simultaneously.”Nonne ergo ‘semper’, 
quod videtur designare totum tempus, multo verius si de illa dicitur, intelligitur significare æternitatem, quae 
sibi ipsi numquam est dissimilis, quam temporum varietatem, quæ sibi semper in aliquo est non similis? Quare 
si dicitur semper esse: quoniam idem est illi esse et vivere, nihil melius intelligitur quam æterne esse vel vivere, 
id est interminabilem vitam perfecte simul totam obtinere (24.14-18.42).
57 In Anselm’s reply to Gaunilo, he persisted in saying this: “For if it is also said that time is always and the 
world is everywhere, it is not meant, nevertheless, that time is always as a unity or that the world is everywhere 
as a whole. And just as the individual parts of time are not when the other parts are, so they can be thought 
never to exist.”Nam et si dicatur tempus semper esse et mundus ubique, non tamen illud totum semper aut 
iste totus est ubique. Et sicut singulæ partes temporis non sunt quando aliæ sunt, ita possunt numquam esse 
cogitari (1.25-28.131). Anselm makes a connection between the temporal existence of something “always” 
and its cause that is “always” (De Veritate 10).
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Anselm has begun to tie his strands of Eternity together in this modified 
Boethian definition, and returns where he started: The true Eternity, that is present 
in the Supreme Substance, is at its base a se and limitless.58 Whereas earlier true 
was used as a modifier of Eternity in order to derive its limitlessness, now it is used 
to describe a unique nature, a nature that distinguishes it from what it has created.
Conclusion
Regardless of whether he made any profound innovations with respect to Time 
or Tense, Anselm made a significant contribution to the conception of Eternity by 
connecting it to a well-articulated notion of God as Maximum. For this contribution, 
it matters less whether Anselm believed in an A or B (or any other) theory of time 
than that Anselm believed Time to be fundamentally a created thing that God could 
in no way be dependent upon. 
Anselm’s idea of God as Maximum led him to develop a logic of simplicity, based 
upon the De Trinitate’s of Augustine and Boethius. Through a better understanding 
of the transcendent Eternity, he established the criteria for how this Eternity could be 
immanent. It had to be present with/in its creation, which was made in its own image, 
but it had to be present “always” and “everywhere” in a way that did not contradict 
its transcendence. The logic of simplicity brought to light ambiguities in the metaphor 
of presence that did not accord with ideas of God as Maximum. Taking a cue from 
Boethius’ treatment of God’s inability to be contained by place, and applying this 
insight about the nature of the presence metaphor to time, Anselm articulated the 
nature of the transcendent-immanent presence of Eternity with/in time. He correctly 
located a problem of immanence within the metaphors of presence and containment. 
The Highest Nature, which is pure Eternity, is present with, contains, and transcends 
time. With his unfolding of the transcendent and immanent nature of Eternity, Anselm 
then shows that they are enfolded within the Boethian definition of Eternity, which 
he has modified slightly to include the Augustinian insight that God’s life is his being.
Much contemporary scholarship has sought the significance and categorization 
of Anselm’s Eternity. But how ought Anselm’s Eternity to be categorized? I would 
argue that attempts to categorize conceptions of Eternity as either “timeless” 
or “temporal” ask the wrong question. It must be both for two reasons. First, 
Anselm’s Eternity is timeless/atemporal in the sense that it transcends time and its 
life-being does not suffer the consequences that temporal things do when they are 
extended throughout time. God’s life-being does not begin or end. It never verges 
on nothingness. It is timeless in every way that satisfies maximal greatness, which 
is to say, a way that implies transcendent Eternity’s immanent interaction with 
Time. God can never be dependent upon his creation, and therefore, He cannot 
be temporal. Second, it is impossible for God to be absent from his creation, and 
yet, Time cannot be something that God participates in. Eternity must therefore 
be present with Time and times, in a unique way that allows it to remain wholly 
indivisible and independent from it. The difficulties of comprehending such an 
Eternity are not because the idea is incoherent but because our categories and 
metaphors are insufficient for the task. Eternity is uniquely one, comparable and 
relatively comprehensible only because it has made things according to its likeness. 
58 “For it is clearly perceived that this true eternity is alone in this substance, which alone is not made, but 
was found to be the maker of all things: since true eternity is understood to be the period that lack beginning 
and end.” Nam vel hoc solo veram æternitatem soli illi inesse substantiæ, quæ sola non facta sed factrix esse 
inventa est, aperte percipitur: quoniam vera æternitas principii fi nisque meta carere intelligitur (24.25-28.42).
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